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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Mark Banez appeals from the district court's order and judgment summarily
dismissing his Second Amended Petition for Post Conviction Relief.

On appeal, he

asserts that the district court erred when it concluded, against the uncontradicted
evidence, that summary dismissal was appropriate because Mr. Banez failed to
demonstrate prejudice as to two claims concerning his attorney's refusal to permit him
to testify at trial. Because the evidence in support of his claims was uncontradicted, the
district court erred when it summarily dismissed his claims that he was deprived of his
right to testify on his own behalf at trial and received ineffective assistance of counsel
when his attorney did not permit him to testify.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
After counsel was appointed to assist Mr. Boncz in pursuing post-conviction relief
(R., p.47), post-conviction counsel, with leave of the district court (R., p.105), filed a
verified Second Amended Petition for Post Conviction Relief (hereinafter, Second
Amended Petition), in which Mr. Banez asserted, inter alia, that he received "Ineffective
Assistance of Trial Counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, specifically .... I should have been permitted to testify," and in a separate
but related claim, that his attorney's refusal to allow him to testify violated "defendant's
[sic] 5th , 5th, and 14th Amendment rights to a fair trial and due process of law, specifically
... I should have been permitted to testify." (R., p.108.) Mr. Boncz supported these
claims with an affidavit in which he asserted, inter alia,

1

I was not afforded the opportunity to testify at the trial of this matter. My
attorney and I discussed me testifying at the jury trial, and I was going to
testify. When the trial was changed to a court trial, my attorney did not call
me to the stand to testify. Had I testified I would have testified as follows:
a. I did not commit this crime.
b. I did not bungy [sic] cord [the victim] to the bed. The bed was not even
made out. All my stuff was on it. No handles to tie her down.
c. I did not leave her there, walk to the house to go to the bathroom, and
then return only to molest her again.
d. I did not do any of the awful things Dr. Gilbert testified [the victim] said
happened. She only went by what [the victim] said, no proof.
e. The area of the trailer where [the victim] described where my bed was is
not true. My bed was in the front.
f. The area of the trailer where [the victim] described the bed's location
was for a different renter, not me.
g. I started locking the door three months after I moved in there when
Daniel had a sleepover and he and his buddies came out to put shaving
cream in my hand and then tickle my nose.
(R., pp.102-03.) The trial transcript 1 reflects no discussion of Mr. Boncz's right to testify,
let alone whether he understood and waived that right. (Trial Tr., p.263, L.13 - p.264,
L.25.)
Prior to the filing of Mr. Boncz's Second Amended Petition, the State filed a
Motion for Summary Disposition and a Brief in Support of Motion for Summary
Disposition, which did not address the claims that he was deprived of his right to testify

The State requested that the district court take judicial notice of, inter alia, the trial
transcript from the underlying criminal case. (R., p.82.) Under I.R.E. 201 (d), the district
court was required to take judicial notice upon the request of any party. I.R.E. 201 (cl).
Additionally, in its order summarily dismissing the Second Amended Petition, the district
court referred to the trial transcript, implying that it had taken judicial notice of it.
(R., p.133.)
1

2

on his own behalf and received ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney did
not permit him to testify. 2 (R., pp.75-81.) After Mr. Boncz filed his Second Amended
Petition, the State simply filed a Renewed Motion for Summary Disposition and Request
for Hearing, incorporating by reference its original motion and brief in support, adding no
additional argument or grounds for summary dismissal. (R., p.115.)
Following a hearing at which the State made no argument concerning the claims
that Mr. Banez was deprived of his right to testify at trial and received ineffective
assistance of counsel when his attorney did not permit him to testify (Tr., p.12, L.11 p.14, L. 7), the district court issued an order summarily dismissing Mr. Boncz's Second
Amended Petition in its entirety. 3 (R., pp.129-36.)
Mr. Banez filed a premature, but ultimately timely, Notice of Appeal. (R., p.140.)

This is not surprising, as these claims were raised for the first time in the Second
Amended Petition.
3 Because, as will be seen in the argument section, the district court erred in summarily
dismissing on the merits and this matter should be remanded for an evidentiary hearing,
Mr. Boncz does not deem it necessary to seek remand for the district court to provide
the twenty days' notice required under Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319 (1995),
prior to reissuing an order and judgment summarily dismissing these claims.
2

3

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it concluded, against the uncontradicted evidence, that
summary dismissal was appropriate as to the claims that Mr. Banez was deprived of his
constitutional right to testify at trial and received ineffective assistance of counsel when
his attorney did not permit him to testify?

4

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Concluded 1 Against The Uncontradicted Evidence,
That Summary Dismissal Was Appropriate As To The Claims That Mr. Banez Was
Deprived Of His Constitutional Right To Testify At Trial And Received Ineffective
Assistance Of Counsel When His Attorney Did Not Permit Him To Testify

A.

Introduction
In summarily dismissing Mr. Boncz's claims that he was deprived of his right to

testify in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments when his attorney did
not permit him to testify and received ineffective assistance of counsel, under the Sixth
Amendment, when his attorney did not permit him to testify, the district court concluded
that Mr. Banez had failed to establish, as a disputed issue of material fact, that he was
prejudiced. The key problem with the district court's analysis is that it incorrectly failed
to perceive Mr. Boncz's claim that he was deprived of his constitutional right to testify as
separate and distinct from his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to
his attorney's refusal to call him to testify. Regardless of whether Mr. Boncz's claim is
considered one of ineffective assistance of trial counsel for not calling him to testify or a
standalone claim that he was deprived of his right to testify at trial, the district court
erred when it concluded, against the uncontradicted evidence, that summary dismissal
was appropriate.

B.

Relevant Jurisprudence
An application for post-conviction relief is civil in nature. Gilpin-Grubb v. State,

138 Idaho 76, 79-80 (2002). An application for post-conviction relief must be verified
with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant. I.C. § 19-4903.

5

The application must include affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its
allegations, or must state why such supporting evidence is not included. Id.
The court may summarily dismiss a petition for post-conviction relief when the
court is satisfied the applicant is not entitled to relief and no purpose would be served by
further proceedings.

I.C. § 19-4906(b).

In considering summary dismissal in a case

where evidentiary facts are not disputed, summary dismissal may be appropriate,
despite the possibility of conflicting inferences, because the court alone will be
responsible for resolving the conflict between the inferences.

See State v. Yakovac,

145 Idaho 437, 444 (2008) (addressing case where State did not file a response to
petition).

However, where the facts are disputed, a court is required to accept the

petitioner's unrebutted factual allegations as true, but it need not accept the petitioner's
conclusions. Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 903 (2007).
Summary disposition on the pleadings and record is not proper if a material issue
of fact exists.

I.C. § 19-4906.

When genuine issues of material fact exist that, if

resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to relief, summary
disposition is improper and an evidentiary hearing must be held. Baldwin v. State, 145
Idaho 148, 153 (2008).
When reviewing a district court's order of summary dismissal in a post-conviction
relief proceeding, the reviewing court applies the same standard as that applied by the
district court. Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 675 (2010). Therefore, on review of a
dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an evidentiary hearing, this Court
determines whether a genuine issue of fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions
and admissions together with any affidavits on file and liberally construes the facts and

6

reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 903
(citation omitted). The lower court's legal conclusions are reviewed de nova. Owen v.
State, 130 Idaho 715, 716 (1997).

C.

The District Court Erred When It Concluded, Against The Uncontradicted
Evidence, That Summary Dismissal Was Appropriate As To The Claims That
Mr. Banez Was Deprived Of His Constitutional Right To Testify At Trial And
Received Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel When His Attorney Did Not Permit
Him To Testify
In summarily dismissing Mr. Boncz's claims that he was deprived of his

constitutional right to testify at trial and received ineffective assistance of counsel when
his attorney did not permit him to testify, the district court reasoned,
In order to survive the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal, Petitioner
Boncz must show the existence of material issues of fact as to whether:
(1) counsel's performance was deficient, and (2) that deficiency prejudiced
appellant's case. Petitioner claims he wanted to testify but was prevented
from doing so by his counsel, which is a material issue of fact as to
whether trial counsel's representation was deficient.[4]
However,
Petitioner has failed to meet the second prong of the Strickland test, which
is to show the existence of material issues of fact that he was prejudiced
by not being allowed to testify. During his statement to the court at
sentencing, Petitioner Boncz provided the court with no exculpatory facts
or evidence not produced at trial.[5] The same is true of his Petition, as
Boncz offers the Court no exculpatory facts not already presented at trial.
(R., pp.133-34.)

This finding is supported by Mr. Boncz's uncontradicted statement in his affidavit that
he was "not afforded the opportunity to testify at the trial of this matter" through the
actions of his attorney (R., p.102), and the district court's review of the trial transcript,
summarized by the district court as follows, "The Court, after reviewing a transcript of
the trial, notes that at the time defense counsel informed the court it was resting, the
court made no inquiry of Banez to insure he understood he had the right to testify, but
was not required to testify." (R., p.133.)
5 It is unclear why the district court focused on Mr. Boncz's al locution, as he had already
been found guilty, and nothing he said at sentencing could have changed the verdict
already rendered.
4

7

A claim that a petitioner was deprived of his right to testify at trial can be
considered as either one of ineffective assistance of counsel under Stricklancf or as a
deprivation of a fundamental constitutional right. This distinction was explored at length
by the Court of Appeals in Rossignol v. State, 152 Idaho 700 (Ct. App. 2012), in which
the Court explained that the "distinction is significant because it determines which party
bears the burden of persuasion on appeal to show whether the alleged deprivation was
prejudicial or harmless." Rossignol, 152 Idaho at 703. The Court of Appeals explained
that determining which type of claim has been raised "requires an analysis of how [the
petitioner's] claim was pied and argued before the district court." Id. at 706. A petitioner
benefits from pleading the claim as being a deprivation of a constitutional right because,
once a petitioner establishes a deprivation of the constitutional right to testify at trial, the
burden shifts to the State to prove that the deprivation was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.

Id. at 704 (citing State v. Darbin, 109 Idaho 516, 522 (Ct. App.

1985)).
Mr. Banez pied two separate claims relating to his attorney's refusal to allow him
to testify at trial, namely,
a) Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel in violation of the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, specifically ... I should
have been permitted to testify.
b) Violation of defendant's [sic] 5th , 6th , and 14th Amendment rights to a fair
trial and due process of law, specifically ... I should have been permitted
to testify.

6

See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
8

(R., p.108. 7 ) In its order summarily dismissing his Second Amended Petition, the district
court began its analysis by recognizing that Mr. Banez raised "claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel and violations of his 5th , 6th , and 14th Amendment rights to a fair
trial and due process of law," noting, "Petitioner contends trial counsel did not allow him
to testify in his own defense at trial and trial counsel was ineffective by failing to hire an
expert to tesify [sic] on his behalf." (R., p.132 (emphases added).) Inexplicably, the
district court then proceeded to analyze the claims solely as ineffective assistance
claims under Strickland. (R., pp.133-34.)

1.

Mr. Banez Was Deprived Of His Constitutional Right To Testify At Trial

Mr. Banez provided sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact
as to whether he was deprived of his constitutional right to testify at trial.

Because

Mr. Boncz is not required to establish prejudice or harm from this deprivation, the State
must establish that the deprivation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In this
case, the State presented no evidence of any kind to dispute Mr. Boncz's claim that he
was deprived of his constitutional right to testify.

Even assuming that summary

dismissal could ever be possible on such a claim when the State actually does present
evidence in support of a motion for summary dismissal (as it would inevitably involve a
factual determination of an issue in dispute), there was no basis upon which the district
court could have fqund that Mr. Boncz did not raise a genuine issue of material fact as
to this claim because all of the evidence presented in support was uncontradicted. As

The material omitted by ellipses concern claims regarding the lack of a defense expert
witness. Mr. Boncz does not challenge the summary dismissal of those claims.
7
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such, the district court erred when it summarily dismissed Mr. Boncz's claim that he was
deprived of his constitutional right to testify at trial.

Mr. Boncz Received Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel
As found by the district court, Mr. Banez presented sufficient evidence to raise a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether his attorney performed deficiently in
refusing to permit him to testify at trial. (R., p.133.) As such, the only remaining issue is
whether the evidence presented in support of the prejudice prong raised a sufficient
issue of material fact. Given the fact that, at summary dismissal, all evidence must be
viewed in the light most favorable to Mr. Boncz, it is easy to conclude that a genuine
issue of material fact exists on the prejudice prong.

At trial, the State presented

testimony from a number of witnesses, including the alleged victim, S.M. and Dr. Joyce
Gilbert, a pediatrician who specializes in evaluating children for abuse.
S.M. testified that "a long time ago," when she was younger (she couldn't
remember what age she was), 8 Mr. Banez lived in a trailer behind her parents' house.
(Trial Tr., p.90, L.15 - p.91, L.23.) One day her mother sent her to tell Mr. Banez that
lunch was ready in the house.

(Trial Tr., p.95, Ls.5-9.)

She knocked on the door,

Mr. Banez told her to enter, and she went inside. (Trial Tr., p.95, Ls.12-13.) Mr. Banez,
who was sitting on his bed, told her he couldn't see her, and she went over to his bed
and sat down. (Trial Tr., p.95, Ls.14-24.) He then removed her pants and underwear,
left her shirt on, took off his underwear and inserted his penis into her vagina. (Trial
Tr., p.96, L.3 - p.98, L.20.) During the encounter, S.M. told him to stop, and used her

8

S.M. was probably five or six years old at the time. (Trial Tr., p.192, Ls.1-4.) She was
ten years old at the time of trial. (Trial Tr., p.87, Ls.24-25.)
10

arms to try to push him off of her. (Trial Tr., p.99, Ls.5-13.) She didn't remember much
else, except that Mr. Banez put her underwear and pants back on, at which point she
went back to the house alone. (Trial Tr., p.99, L.17

p.100, L.11.) "Probably an hour

afterwards," Mr. Banez entered the house and ate lunch. (Trial Tr., p.100, Ls.21-22.)
Dr. Gilbert testified that she had evaluated S.M. for suspected sexual abuse
approximately one year before trial.

(Trial Tr., p.176, Ls.8-14.)

In recounting the

alleged incident, S.M. described the event to Dr. Gilbert as follows:
She said that she went to the trailer and when she walked into the trailer
that Mark was in the bed covered with a blanket and she said that he had
boxers on under the blanket. She said that he got up out of bed and
started talking with [S.M.] and then he went into the back room and got
some bungie cords. She said then that he took off all of her clothes and
layed [sic] her on the bed and wrapped a bungie cord around each one of
her arms and each one of her legs and hooked it to the end of the bed.
At this time I'm taking the history. She has her clothes on but she
demonstrated for me on the exam table exactly what happened and she
layed [sic] on the exam table and put her arms above her head and her
feet spread wide and said that that's how she was tied to the bed. She
said then that Mark took off his boxers and got on top of her.

She then told me that she - that Mark put his ding-dong in her tah-tah
area for a few minutes and then he got off of her, left her laying on the bed
and went into the house to go to the bathroom.
She said she watched him put his boxers and his jeans back on to go into
the house and then just left her lying in the trailer. She then said that she
knew - what I write here is apparently she knows but I don't know exactly
how she knows that her mom asked Mark where [S.M.] was and Mark said
[S.M.] was out playing in the sand box and would be in in a few minutes.
Mark used the restroom in the house and then came back to the trailer,
took off his jeans and his boxers again. She again insisted that he had a

9

The omitted passage concerns the names that S.M. uses for male and female
genitalia and her knowledge of condoms. She calls the penis a "ding-dong" and the
vagina a "tah-tah." (Trial Tr., p.194, L.25 - p.196, L.24.)
11

condom on when he was doing this. And I don't know exactly how she
knows that because she told me she did not see him put one on. But she
does know exactly what a condom is and she described it completely to
me that it's something that you put on your ding-dong when it is hard.
She then went on to say that his ding-dong went into her tah-tah again
and that this time he was humping her. I asked her to explain exactly
what humping meant and she said it's when you put your ding-dong in a
tah-tah and then you move up and down and up and down really fast.
She said that it hurt and that when he was all done, and she thinks this
took a few minutes, that he unhooked her from the bungie cords, she put
on her clothes really fast and ran back into the house and was crying.
(Trial Tr., p.194, L.5 - p.198, L.5.)
As can be seen from comparing the two versions told just a year apart, there are
significant differences. In the one testified to at trial by S.M., Mr. Banez did not get out
of bed, did not bind her to the bed with bungie cords, and she was able to resist with her
unbound arms. Further, Mr. Banez did not leave and return to commit the act again. In
the version told to Dr. Gilbert, Mr. Boncz got up from the bed, bound her arms and legs
with bungie cords, and after the initial act, went to the house to use the restroom before
returning to commit the act again.

These differences are significant, and the

inconsistency with respect to the bungie cord was concerning to Dr. Gilbert.
Dr. Gilbert testified that, in her experience, it is not unusual for a child to have
"some" "minor inconsistencies" when telling and retelling an incident of abuse. (Trial
Tr., p.208, Ls.9-17.) What is most important is "consistencies in the major part of the
stories." (Trial Tr., p.208, Ls.18-22.) Asked by the district court to testify concerning her
classification of inconsistencies as minor or major, Dr. Gilbert replied,
If I can speak specifics about this case. Minor inconsistency might be the
difference between breakfast and lunch time. A major inconsistency
would be if when [S.M.] told one of the entities who was questioning her
that one time she had bungie cords tying her up arms and legs and
another time she didn't ... But if she said it happened in different rooms

12

or if she, you know, again one time it happened with a bungie cord and the
next time it didn't, those would be things that would lead me to believe that
maybe this episode didn't happen or it happened in different ways than
she's telling me.
(Trial Tr., p.237, L.17- p.238, L.12.)
Mr. Banez presented evidence that, had his attorney allowed him to exercise his
constitutional right to testify at trial, he would have testified as follows:
a. I did not commit this crime.
b. I did not bungy [sic] cord [the victim] to the bed. The bed was not even
made out. All my stuff was on it. No handles to tie her down.
c. I did not leave her there, walk to the house to go to the bathroom, and
then return only to molest her again.
d. I did not do any of the awful things Dr. Gilbert testified [the victim] said
happened. She only went by what [the victim] said, no proof.
e. The area of the trailer where [the victim] described where my bed was is
not true. My bed was in the front.
f. The area of the trailer where [the victim] described the bed's location
was for a different renter, not me.
g. I started locking the door three months after I moved in there when
Daniel [S.M.'s older brother] had a sleepover and he and his buddies
came out to put shaving cream in my hand and then tickle my nose.
(R., pp.102-03.)

Mr. Boncz's anticipated testimony was much more than a mere

assertion of innocence. It included detailed refutations of aspects of S.M.'s story that
were not otherwise presented to the district court during trial.

In light of the major

inconsistencies in S.M.'s versions of events and the fact that the matter was at the
summary dismissal stage, Mr. Boncz asserts that the district court erred when it
summarily dismissed his claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when
his attorney refused to permit him to testify at trial.

13

In light of the foregoing, Mr. Banez asserts that the district court erred when it
summarily dismissed his claims that he was deprived of his constitutional right to testify
when his attorney refused to permit him to testify at trial and received ineffective
assistance of counsel when his attorney refused to permit him to testify at trial.

As

such, he respectfully requests that this Court vacate the judgment summarily dismissing
his Second Amended Petition as to these claims, and remand this matter for an
evidentiary hearing on both claims.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Banez respectfully requests that this Court
vacate the judgment summarily dismissing his two claims concerning his attorney's
refusal to allow him to testify, and remand this matter for an evidentiary hearing on both
claims.
DATED this 8 th day of July, 2014.

tate Appellate Public Defender
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